This study interprets and interrelates the major political, economic and security developments in Europe – including transatlantic relations – from the end of World War II up until the present time, and looks ahead to how the continent may evolve politically in the future. It weaves all the different strands of European events together into a single picture that gives the reader a deep understanding of the continent, and of its current and future challenges. The first chapters trace European reconstruction and political, economic and security developments – both in the East and in the West – leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Later chapters examine the European Union's reform efforts, enlargement, movement to a single currency and emerging security role; the political and economic changes in central and Eastern Europe, including Russia; the break up of Yugoslavia and the wars that ensued; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)'s enlargement and search for a new mission. Final chapters deal with forces affecting Europe's future, such as terrorism, nationalism, religion, demographic trends and globalisation.
implies that national governments would lose control over who would be admitted to their territory. It also brings closer the concept that individuals may be expected to owe a higher allegiance to Europe than to their nation of birth or adoption. THE EFFECTS OF THE SINGLE CURRENCY The development of the single currency has, of course, been of great importance to the European project. However, it is no longer a live political issue. The single currency is here to stay for the time being and its successful introduction in early 2002 confirms that there is little point in
? How should power be shared among the governments of the member states as represented in the Council of Ministers, the peoples of the Union as represented in the European Parliament, and an appointed but political bureaucracy, the Commission? How open and transparent could the EU be, given the many sensitive issues it was now handling, such as foreign policy, security and defence? Rendering answers to these questions more urgent was the arrival, in January 1999, of the Economic and Monetary Union and the single currency, the euro, among eleven (and soon twelve) EU
Europe whose strength would rest ultimately on the joint pillars of its single currency and a common security and defence policy could be viewed either as a counterweight or as a counterpart of American leadership and power. The distinction is real. The defining image of a counterweight is adversarial, as the ‘weight’ to ‘counter’ would be primarily, if not exclusively, that of the United States.12 Fears of such a counter have to do with the assumption that Europe’s follower-ship must be absolute lest America’s leadership be weakened. As the image gains focus, the euro
the Commonwealth and the USA are seen by other countries as a lack of commitment to the European experiment. Like British–French tension, this has endured ever since. Margaret Thatcher’s constant sniping at attempts to create a closer Britain and the European Union 251 political union and her opting out of the Social Chapter and the single currency at Maastricht in 1992 have reminded Europeans that Britain remains suspicious of European integration. It was, therefore, no surprise that Britain’s half-hearted attempts at entry were rejected. In 1967 the British
, but unable to make or amend European law. • The Court of Justice: to handle disputes between members and to deliver interpretations of European law. We can see how similar this arrangement was to that of the ECSC. So, in 1957 the great European project was under way. Only six original members had signed up and success was far from assured. By 2002 it had grown to fifteen members with several others queuing up to join. A single market had been established and twelve of the members were using a single currency. At first sight this seems an impressive achievement in a
-profile European policy. Deeply concerned with the economic impact of integration and with the negotiations of the Structural Funds (Delors Packages I and II), the government had a very cautious position towards the development of political union. This is clearly demonstrated by the positions adopted at the 1991 IGC. While favouring the single currency and economic and social cohesion, the Portuguese government opposed the inclusion of any kind of federal commitment and was not very supportive to the establishment of a CFSP, especially its security and defence dimensions. At
and promotion of the free market by signing the Maastricht Treaty. This opened a schism in the Conservative Party that Major exacerbated by paying insufficient attention to the growth of Euro-sceptic sentiment. Membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) prolonged recession and undermined the party’s reputation for economic competence. Finally, Euro-sceptics argued that Major’s unwillingness to rule out British entry into the single currency for at least the next Parliament left the party unable to capitalise on the Euro-scepticism that prevailed in the
encouraged this atmosphere with his aggressive responses to criticism. When twelve senior figures, including Chris Patten, signed a letter calling for Britain to prepare for a single currency, Hague called them ‘yesterday’s men’.16 When later there was talk of de-selecting pro-European The Conservatives, 1997–2001 233 MPs, some people at the grass roots level clearly felt that they were doing the leader’s bidding. The absence of ideas The difficulty was that the libertarian agenda Hague pursued and his attempts to reform the party were conceived in isolation from
-up. In addition to these, priority was given to sectoral policies and EU regulation that were likely to have an impact on Ireland’s competitive position and on regulatory frameworks at national level. The Internal Market programme was thus accorded a high priority because of the weight of EC legislation and the need to prepare the Irish industry and the service sector for the competitive shock of the 1992 programme. The TEU marked a further deepening of integration with the inclusion of provisions on a single currency, the CFSP and pillar three. Rather than dislodging