This book deals with the institutional framework in post-socialist, after-empire spaces. It consists of nine case studies and two contributions of a more theoretical nature. Each of these analytical narratives sheds some light on the micro-politics of organised violence. After 1990, Serbs and Croats were competing over access to the resources needed for institution building and state building. Fear in turn triggered ethnic mobilisation. An 'unprofessional' riot of Serbs in the Krajina region developed into a professional war between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, in which several thousand died and several hundred thousand people were forcefully expelled from their homes. The Herceg-Bosnian style of resistance can be surprisingly effective. It is known that most of the heroin transported along the Balkans route passes through the hands of Albanian mafia groups; that this traffic has taken off since summer 1999. The concept of Staatnation is based on the doctrine according to which each 'nation' must have its own territorial State and each State must consist of one 'nation' only. The slow decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet and the Yugoslav empires was partly triggered, partly accompanied by the quest for national sovereignty. Dagestan is notable for its ethnic diversity and, even by post-Soviet standards, its dramatic economic deprivation. The integrative potential of cooperative movements at the republican, the regional and the inter-state level for the Caucasus is analyzed. The book also offers insights into the economics of ending violence. Finally, it addresses the question of reconciliation after ethnic cleansing.
, S. and Vandeginste , S. (eds), L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2010–2011 ( Paris :
L’Harmattan ), pp. 303 – 18 .
Ingelaere , B. ( 2011b ), ‘The ruler’s drum and the people’s shout: Accountability and representation on Rwanda’s hills’ , in Straus , S. and Waldorf , L. (eds), Remaking Rwanda: StateBuilding and Human Rights after Mass Violence ( Madison : University of Wisconsin Press ), pp. 67 – 78 .
Ingelaere , B. ( 2012 ), ‘From Model to Practice: Researching and Representing Rwanda’s “Modernized” Gacaca Courts’ , Critique of
(Ostfildern: Thorbecke Verlag, 2014).
Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation
serve as a kind of model for research on subsidies in diplomatic
and political terms. There are a number of particular connections
between the two: there is no clear concept, but the notion is used
in multiple ways; the notion is used for personal or state relations,
for a practice inside political communities, and for external relations;
the notion and practice do change during the early modern period,
and this change is significant for the state-building process and for
Primitive state-buildingState-building is the effort of rulers to institutionalise state structures capable of absorbing expanding political mobilisation and controlling territory corresponding to an identity community. In the Middle East, the flaws built into the process from its origins have afflicted the states with enduring legitimacy deficits (Hudson 1977). Because imperialism drew boundaries that haphazardly corresponded to identity, installed client elites in them and created the power machineries of the new
State–society relations and conflict in post-socialist Transcaucasia
evolved and culturally embedded patterns of state–society relations as
a key variable.1 A speciﬁc mode of statebuilding, adapted to and shaped by a culturally mediated social structure, is analysed as a crucial precondition for the
proliferation of ethnic violence.
The analysis is based on ﬁve theses. Starting from the secure ground of more
or less commonly accepted knowledge on conﬂict analysis, the chapter ﬁnishes
with considerations of a rather speculative character. Owing to a lack of
suﬃcient empirical data the chapter is conﬁned to drawing the blueprint of an
Indian [ sic ] were British, but the projects of statebuilding in both countries – documentation, legitimation,
classification, and bounding, and the institutions therewith
– often reflected theories, experiences, and practices
worked out originally in India and then applied to Great
Britain, as well as vice versa. Many aspects of metropolitan
The expansion and significance of violence in early modern
which the expanding scale of warfare and
numerous state-building projects, driven in large part by rapid economic change,
involved rising levels of interpersonal and social violence, it was critical to believe
that violence ultimately had pure and virtuous goals in the deeper past – that kinship, citizenship, and ‘peace’ itself were guaranteed by the righteous warrior and
his loyal adherents.
Something of a historical revolution attended social, political, and economic
transformation in the nineteenth century. However, in the course of the twentieth century, the trend
not understood as simply ad hoc fragments of humanity. Rather, state-building practices over several centuries ensured that they came to take on the mantle of fundamental unit of political community, the sine qua non of human community and, to a greater or lesser extent, the theatre of ethical life. Moreover, in the dominant versions at least, states came to be understood as constituted by an essentially uniform people, whether that uniformity was conceived of as the expression of ethnicity, shared culture and will, as the assemblage of atomised individuals
Barth’s terms.2 It is precisely the validity of these boundaries which is challenged under globalisation. Central to understanding the role of the state in
post-Soviet Eurasian security is the recognition of its embeddedness in the
overlapping and contradictory processes of cultural flux, statebuilding and
This chapter investigates both the state in post-Soviet Eurasia as the
primary site of institutionalisation and the state’s concerted international
action in the sphere of security. This investigation requires
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.