Economies of allegiance

French subsidies played a central role in European politics from Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494 until the French Revolution. French kings attempted to frustrate what they viewed as a Habsburg bid to pursue universal monarchy. During the seventeenth century, the French monarchy would embrace the payment of subsidies on a different scale than previously, using alliances in which subsidies played a prominent role to pursue crucial aspects of royal policy. Louis XIII made alliances promising subsidies to support the United Provinces’ resumed war against the king of Spain, and for the Danish, Swedish, and various German princes to fight against the Holy Roman Emperor. Louis XIV continued some of these subsidies and used subsidies as a tool in order to implement his own politics. When Louis XIV appeared to Dutch and some English statesmen as aspiring to Universal monarchy, the Dutch and particularly the English used the tool of subsidies to frustrate the French monarch. During the eighteenth century, principally the French and the British, but also the Austrians, used subsidies to procure allies and attempt to maintain the balance of power. The subsidy system prompted significant debates about the legal, political, and moral implications, and was sometimes a source of political conflict between competing power groupings within states. The book argues that participation in the French system of subsidies neither necessarily accelerated nor necessarily retarded state development; but such participation could undoubtedly change political dynamics, the creation of institutions, and the form of states that would emerge.

Raymond Hinnebusch

the Arab world. Neither type of regime, however, effectively resolved the legitimacy deficit for both tended to centre on exclusivistic tribal, personalistic or ethnic ruling cores, generated new, privileged, state-dependent classes, and either brought the mass of citizens to trade political rights for socio-economic entitlements or repressed their demands for political participation. Such patterns of state formation are likely to have profound consequences for foreign policy: if the state itself is contested, foreign policy may entail its defence as much against

in The international politics of the Middle East
Intermediating the French subsidies to Sweden during the Thirty Years’ War
Marianne Klerk

Economy and Sweden’s Role as a Great Power 1632–1697’, in Sweden’s Age of Greatness 1632–1718, ed. by Michael Roberts (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 79–100 (p. 94). 214 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation of states through their contacts. However, such studies still focus on individual contractors supplying their ‘own’ domestic states. Following the Tilly thesis regarding war-making and state-making, a particular emphasis is thereby placed on the formative power of foreign subsidies in building up the modern, sovereign state and the European state system. This

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Open Access (free)
Svante Norrhem and Erik Thomson

Historische Forschung 24 (1997), 509–574. 2 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation Money was so central to these changes that the English historian Mark Greengrass has claimed that ‘money was the dissolvent of Christendom’, providing Europe’s states with resources and motives to engage in destructive conflict with one another.2 Historians have created an extensive and rich literature on European fiscality. They have examined constitutional battles about the control and amount of taxation, theories of finance, the development of public debt, and the organization and

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Peter H. Wilson

: Peter Keir Taylor, Indentured to Liberty: Peasant Life and the Hessian Military State, 1688–1815 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Charles W. Ingrao, The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick II 1760–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Die ‘Hessen’ im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1776–1783), ed. by Holger Th. Gräf, Andreas Hedwig, and Annegret Wenz-Haubfleisch (Marburg: Historische Kommission für Hessen, 2014). 70 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation The European Fiscal-Military System European

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Diplomacy, cross-border patronage, and the negotiation of subsidy alliances in the north-western part of the Holy Roman Empire (late seventeenth century)
Tilman Haug

Steiner, 1964–1965), vol. 2, pp. 5–11. 6 Antje Oschmann, Die Friedensverträge mit Frankreich und Schweden, vol.1: Urkunden. Acta Pacis Westphalicae, Serie III Abt. B (Münster: Aschendorff, 1998), p. 11. 190 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation alliances was regarded as a clear step towards sovereign power politics outside the empire.7 More recent research, however, has rather placed it in the context of regional defence and peacekeeping or a right of resistance assumed by imperial estates. Despite the pursuit of their own interests, electors and princes

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
German reception of French subsidies in the Thirty Years’ War
Tryntje Helfferich

. Not only were personal princely incomes usually insufficient to allow extensive warfare, but the representative bodies (estates) 44 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation of territories wielded traditional rights to approve taxation, and they frequently placed limits on the ability of princes to shift the financial burden to their subjects. And indeed, the cost of maintaining an army was enormous. The ten-to-fifteen-thousand-man imperial army of the Lower Rhinish-Westphalian Circle, for example, required approximately 1–1.5 million reichstaler annually, while

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
The example of the German principality of Waldeck
Andreas Flurschütz da Cruz

Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). 5 Venice, Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASVe), Senato, Deliberazioni, Corti, Registri, 63, and other holdings; Benjamin Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire in the Early Modern Period’, in A Companion to Venetian History, 1400–1797, 174 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation Those three powers are politically characterized by their corporate structure and mixed monarchical or republican constitution. Their oligarchic regimes favoured a ‘classical republican

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Anuschka Tischer

(Ostfildern: Thorbecke Verlag, 2014). 26 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation serve as a kind of model for research on subsidies in diplomatic and political terms. There are a number of particular connections between the two: there is no clear concept, but the notion is used in multiple ways; the notion is used for personal or state relations, for a practice inside political communities, and for external relations; the notion and practice do change during the early modern period, and this change is significant for the state-building process and for an understanding

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789
Svante Norrhem

komma i dagsljuset (Stockholm: Lorens Ludvig Greving, 1767), pp. 65, 67. 94 Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation had ended up in a situation where subsidies were constantly needed for protecting the new territories. Sweden would have been quite a different country, Nordencrantz argues, had that money been invested in agriculture rather than war. The wars and the cost of protecting overseas territories, such as Pomerania in northern Germany, had never been covered by foreign subsidies.3 People in general rejected war, Nordencrantz wrote, claiming that the wars

in Subsidies, diplomacy, and state formation in Europe, 1494–1789