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The challenge of Eurasian security governance

Eurasian security governance has received increasing attention since 1989. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the institution that best served the security interests of the West in its competition with the Soviet Union, is now relatively ill-equipped resolve the threats emanating from Eurasia to the Atlantic system of security governance. This book investigates the important role played by identity politics in the shaping of the Eurasian security environment. It investigates both the state in post-Soviet Eurasia as the primary site of institutionalisation and the state's concerted international action in the sphere of security. This investigation requires a major caveat: state-centric approaches to security impose analytical costs by obscuring substate and transnational actors and processes. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the maturation of what had been described as the 'new terrorism'. Jervis has argued that the western system of security governance produced a security community that was contingent upon five necessary and sufficient conditions. The United States has made an effort to integrate China, Russia into the Atlantic security system via the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation has become engaged in disseminating security concerns in fields such as environment, energy and economy. If the end of the Cold War left America triumphant, Russia's new geopolitical hand seemed a terrible demotion. Successfully rebalancing the West and building a collaborative system with Russia, China, Europe and America probably requires more wisdom and skill from the world's leaders.

a major caveat: state-centric approaches to security impose analytical costs by obscuring substate and transnational actors and processes. In particular, state-centric conceptualisations are inadequate for grasping fully the decentralised aspects of control and organisation, because they overlook the social and discursive dimensions of these processes.3 While this approach is limited in theoretical depth and analytical scope, it is useful for the specific purpose of highlighting the state in its traditional Weberian form, as a uniquely privileged, central

in Limiting institutions?

politics and international co-operation – the latter is achieved mainly by using Putnam’s analogy of the two-level games.15 Liberal intergovernmentalism, in attempting to restore the superiority of state-centric approaches to the study of regional integration, purports to explain, on the one hand, the interaction between states and international organisations and, on the other, the relationship between national preference-formation, coalitional behaviour and interstate bargaining. What is distinctive in this approach is that it offers a range of intellectual

in Theory and reform in the European Union

rethink the ‘meaning and practice of [international] justice’ beyond considerations of state-centred approach to climate change ‘solution’, and beyond the human rights approach (Adger et al. 2011 : 18). The grievable affects animated by the lived experience of loss of the Pacific Islanders have surfaced at international fora; for example during the 2009 climate change negotiations in Copenhagen when Ian Fry, one

in Recognition and Global Politics
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Potentials of disorder in the Caucasus and Yugoslavia

consequence in the probability of organised violence emerging. Institutions matter. The institutional arrangement of a society produces incentive structures for actors, defines the windows of opportunity for political entrepreneurs and establishes the constraints in which actors are locked. Challenging widespread state-centric approaches, it is argued here that the institutional framework consists not only of the institutional legacy of the ‘official’ state institutions of the socialist systems, but also of the ‘shadow’ institutions that have emerged as a response to the

in Potentials of disorder
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Redefining security in the Middle East

fulfilment and happiness. The orientation of critical security as a people-centred, rather than state-centred, approach renders it necessary to focus on the relationship between theory and political praxis. The constructivist school of thought in IR ( Wendt, 1999 ) has made a significant contribution to understanding and theorizing the security of people rather than of states. Constructivism’s two most

in Redefining security in the Middle East

global South to address the pandemic (Mercer et al. , 1991 ; Hershey, 2013 ). The trends identified in international development, and in Zambia's health and education sectors, were slower to emerge in its sport sector. Despite its relatively low priority, throughout the 1990s there remained a very much state-centred approach to sport policy and implementation, with the principal providers of sport services limited to state

in Localizing global sport for development

of integrating policies and actions of the member states’ (Ginsberg 1989 : 1). That definition and the ensuing analysis make it clear, however, that Ginsberg’s ostensibly state-centric approach is essentially locked into a structuralist perspective. He looks first to integration theory and global interdependence to explain foreign policy, invoking what he calls ‘self-styled logic’ (internal decision-making and political

in Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy

stability and violence internal stability was paid, however, by its neighbours, because Milosevic proved to be very skilful at externalising conflicts. An analysis of the institutional framework of society must not be limited to formal state institutions. In challenging widespread state-centric approaches, it has been argued here that the institutional framework of post-socialist societies consists not only of the institutional legacy of ‘official’ state institutions, but also of the ‘shadow’ institutions that have emerged as a response to the organisational voids of

in Potentials of disorder

economies’ (Gilpin, 1987: 14). We cannot simply assume that this conception of states and markets, and domestic from international, reflects a particular historical moment in the study of IPE. Gilpin entrenches the state-market dichotomy still further fifteen years on: In this book I define global political economy as the interaction of the market and such powerful actors as states, multinational firms, and international organizations, a more comprehensive definition than in my 1987 book The Political Economy of International Relations, although both take a state-centric

in Globalisation contested