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Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 5 1 On strategic culture The decision making process in matters of defence is not an abstract construct based purely in the present moment but is, rather, steeped in the beliefs, biases, traditions and cultural identity of the individual country – all of which feeds into its strategic culture.1 [R]ather than obedience or disobedience to an abstract set of stipulative requirements, in times of war what really makes the difference is how a nation state, as a collective identity, ‘behaves’ is the

in Germany and the use of force

Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 25 2 Stunde Null and the ‘construction’ of West German strategic culture Interest politics alone . . . cannot account for Germany’s pacifistic military security policy, nor does it provide a satisfactory explanation of Bonn’s approach to national sovereignty or its aversion to unilateralism. One must look beyond material and political interests to the politics of national identity in post war Germany, which unfolded in searing domestic political debates over rearmament, reunification, and

in Germany and the use of force

Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a framework for understanding developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to ‘9/11’ and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. It then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms, as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the ‘domestics’ of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. It concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture.

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The past as prologue

continuation of conscription, coupled with a static defence budget. On a conceptual level, inspiration for this book derives from the body of literature in the field of security studies on strategic culture. Broadly speaking, strategic culture focuses on the domestic sources of security policy and attempts to identify how the past impacts and shapes contemporary policy behaviour. In contrast to some of the more traditional approaches in security studies, the strategic culture approach is interested in the subjective, nationally specific, aspects of security and defence policy

in Germany and the use of force
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Germany, the use of force and the power of strategic culture

Longhurst, Germany and the use of force.qxd 30/06/2004 16:25 Page 137 7 Conclusions: Germany, the use of force and the power of strategic culture German perspectives on the use of force have evolved rapidly since the ending of the Cold War and today Germany is one of the key contributors to global peacekeeping missions, with an estimated 10,000 Bundeswehr soldiers currently deployed overseas. Seen in this way, Germany has become a ‘net contributor’ to European and international security. Certainly, taboos have been broken and in many ways Germany has

in Germany and the use of force
From Afghanistan to Iraq

This chapter centres on the German responses to September 11 2001 and the ‘War on Terror’. It examines the post-Cold War transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s and tries to assess the nature and extent of change in German strategic culture. It also shows how strategic culture affects policy behaviour. This chapter determines that in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, the Iraq German security policy became focused on three interconnected matters, namely: the reform of the Bundeswehr, the creation of a practical European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and the re-building of relations between Germany and the US.

in Germany and the use of force

This chapter studies the practice of conscription, which is a different aspect of security policy that is characterised by non-change. It demonstrates the power of strategic culture to prevent policy change and studies the continuation of compulsory military service in Germany. It also presents evidence on the obvious mis-match between the arguments that support conscription and the changed strategic environment in Germany. This chapter reveals that conscription is considered as an important factor in maintaining aspects of the previous security policy of the Federal Republic.

in Germany and the use of force
Adjusting to life after the Cold War

-orientated, away from the orthodoxy of the previous forty years, to ensure Germany’s standing as a credible and important ally equipped to deal with unprecedented risks and challenges in line with the pervading strategic culture. The steep learning curve and incremental policy adjustment that occurred during the 1990s are examined in this chapter through the prism of the changing role of the Bundeswehr during the period between the wars in the Gulf and Kosovo of 1990 and 1999. In this time-frame the pace of change was relatively swift, as German security policy exhibited an

in Germany and the use of force
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The study of European Union relations with Mercosur

the zone of security around Europe and to strengthen the international order. However, he argues that the EU is failing as a strategic actor because it does not yet have the necessary ‘strategic culture’. It could perhaps be argued that the problem now is not necessarily a lack of capabilities but a lack of will. In fact, in the European Security Strategy, the EU very much accepts that ‘it should be more capable and responsible’ (Aggestam 2008: 1). Howorth (2010) offers one of the most detailed accounts in relation to the concept of the EU as a strategic actor

in The European Union's policy towards Mercosur:
The evolving European security architecture

Wörner, the concept is ‘the next logical step in the adaptation of our force structures’. Quoted in Cornish, ‘European Security’, p. 763. Ibid., p. 764. Ibid., p. 768. Aybet, NATO’s Developing Role, pp. 52–3. Stuart Croft, ‘Guaranteeing Europe’s Security? Enlarging NATO Again’, International Affairs, 78:1, January 2002, p. 108. See Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: the Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, 77:3, July 2001, p. 588. See Declaration of the European Council on ‘Strengthening the Common European

in Theory and reform in the European Union