Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a framework for understanding developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to ‘9/11’ and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. It then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms, as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the ‘domestics’ of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. It concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture.
Bordering intimacy is a study of how borders and dominant forms of intimacy, such as family, are central to the governance of postcolonial states such as Britain. The book explores the connected history between contemporary border regimes and the policing of family with the role of borders under European and British empires. Building upon postcolonial, decolonial and black feminist theory, the investigation centres on how colonial bordering is remade in contemporary Britain through appeals to protect, sustain and make family life. Not only was family central to the making of colonial racism but claims to family continue to remake, shore up but also hide the organisation of racialised violence in liberal states. Drawing on historical investigations, the book investigates the continuity of colonial rule in numerous areas of contemporary government – family visa regimes, the policing of sham marriages, counterterror strategies, deprivation of citizenship, policing tactics, integration policy. In doing this, the book re-theorises how we think of the connection between liberal government, race, family, borders and empire. In using Britain as a case, this opens up further insights into the international/global circulations of liberal empire and its relationship to violence.
in these Central Asian states initially
raised concerns in Russia, China, Iran and even Turkey. Despite the
American claim that the US military presence in the region was temporary
and contingent on the waronterrorism, the world in general, and Russia
and China in particular, were very much concerned that this temporary
deployment of American troops would become permanent and formalised in
a set of bilateral treaties. At this juncture, it appears certain that the duration
and nature of the US military presence in Central Asia will extend into the
medium term, an
more far-reaching reforms emerged,
with many of Germany’s allies and partners eager to see a greater commitment to modernise the Bundeswehr as well as increase defence
spending. Stimulus for change was then provided by the events of
September 11 2001 and the subsequent US-led waronterrorism, which
served to ﬁnally explode the longstanding assumption that national and
alliance territorial defence was central to the Bundeswehr’s mission and
Certainly, the Bundeswehr at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century is
a very diﬀerent entity from that of the Cold War
especially the United States, unless immediately recognisable vital
interests are at stake as is exemplified by the post-September 11
‘waronterrorism’. Moreover, even the most determined
unilateral intervention falls short of being truly effective, if for no
other reason than its narrowly defined focus on immediate outcomes of
the operation and its almost guaranteed failure to address
in addressing challenges from maritime security to China’s rise, and ASEAN’s transformation from an anti-communist bloc to a forum for major powers to engage made the region’s importance clear. Yet US attention tended to be in reaction to particular crises rather than a focus on the region for its own sake, be it the Asian financial crisis of 1997 or the waronterrorism in the early 2000s. Though this pattern had long been evident, it also prevented the rise of a more strategic, region-wide, and balanced approach to Southeast Asia.
Despite the traditional
Marie Beauchamps, Marijn Hoijtink, Matthias Leese, Bruno Magalhães, and Sharon Weinblum
and Little Security Nothings’, Security
Dialogue 42(4–5): 371–83.
Jackson, R., 2005. Writing the WaronTerrorism: Language,
Politics and Counter-Terrorism , Manchester/New York: Manchester
Jones, R., 2009. ‘Checkpoint Security. Gateways,
Airports and the Architecture of Security’, in K. F. Aas, H. O.
Gundhus and H. M. Lomell, eds, Technologies of InSecurity. The
Reflections on contemporary anarchism, anti-capitalism and the international scene
genuine small-scale initiatives that have occurred.
However, in the wake of the attacks on America on 11 September 2001 and the
subsequent ‘WaronTerrorism’ the opportunities and possibilities for these
autonomous ways of living are by no means certain.
Post-11 September 2001 and the international political scene
The repression of dissent and curtailing of civil liberties – through legislation
like the US ‘Patriot Act’ – that escalated after 11 September 2001, had, in reality,
already begun before. For example, in a report to the US Congress in
integrity rather than susceptibility to
corruption. Although the United States, after September 11, was very
successful in mobilising not only its traditional allies but also other states in
the effort to combat terrorism, two problems are inescapable.
The first is that some states ostensibly comply with the demands to join
the waronterrorism, but tacitly defect from this effort. Saudi Arabia, for
example, at one level has appeared to provide strong support for the United
States in its efforts to attack the financial basis of al-Qaeda. Yet it is not clear
that it has
that she would like to issue indictments but that there are problems in
obtaining evidence.53 Milosevic has claimed that Osama Bin Laden, allegedly
responsible for the attacks on the United States in September 2001, was in
Kosovo with the KLA.54 Might such information redirect American attention
to the Balkans as part of its ‘waronterrorism’? Does NATO have immunity
for the heavy toll of civilian casualties that resulted from its bombing campaign? If it does not, how are NATO, member states, and individuals to be
held responsible for the alleged violations of