legitimising speech act inside the discourse of the
international law, but it spectacularly fails to legitimise the violence
which follows its invocation. Serbia’s attempts to legitimise its
stance as a warringstate defending the idea of state sovereignty was
represented as an anachronism. Indeed, in Kosovo, the end of the
legitimate warringstate was at stake. Where is the political entity
In the story of post-Cold War conceptual confusion, the war in and over Kosovo stands out as a particularly interesting episode. This book provides new and stimulating perspectives on how Kosovo has shaped the new Europe. It breaks down traditional assumptions in the field of security studies by sidelining the theoretical worldview that underlies mainstream strategic thinking on recent events in Kosovo. The book offers a conceptual overview of the Kosovo debate, placing these events in the context of globalisation, European integration and the discourse of modernity and its aftermath. It then examines Kosovo's impact on the idea of war. One of the great paradoxes of the war in Kosovo was that it was not just one campaign but two: there was the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo and the allied bombing campaign against targets in Kosovo and all over Serbia. Serbia's killing of Kosovo has set the parameters of the Balkanisation-integration nexus, offering 'Europe' (and the West in general) a unique opportunity to suggest itself as the strong centre that keeps the margins from running away. Next, it investigates 'Kosovo' as a product of the decay of modern institutions and discourses like sovereignty, statehood, the warring state or the United Nations system. 'Kosovo' has introduced new overtones into the European Weltanschauung and the ways in which 'Europe' asserts itself as an independent power discourse in a globalising world: increasingly diffident, looking for firm foundations in the conceptual void of the turn of the century.
ministers to millions of people every day, receives billions of dollars in income and is a major
player in every crisis? More than this, it is clear that the scale of human suffering remains
prodigious and that for as much good as they do, humanitarians frequently do little in terms of
a net reduction in suffering and misery (think Haiti, Syria, Somalia, DRC, Myanmar, Sri Lanka,
South Sudan). Much suffering – private violence, civil and gang wars, state predation,
poverty, insecurity – is untouched by humanitarian intervention of any
conflict. Now it is perhaps appropriate that
some attention is drawn to contemporary newspapers and periodicals – journalistic reactions fully exposed to public scrutiny and in contrast to the enclosed world of intimate diaries and letters.
In summing up one of the main themes of humanistic and aesthetic opposition to the Great War – the friction that existed between the structure of the
war-state with its resultant ‘herd instinct’ and notions of the sacredness of the
individual – there is perhaps no more apposite personal example than that of
Gilbert Cannan, an
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.
-introducing the Catholic
tradition of a ‘just war’. Neumann’s conclusions are
unflattering for Western politicians, as he questions the morality of a
no-own-losses war, which yields to the temptation of letting other people
die instead. ‘Humanity’ was invoked in Kosovo as a political
notion, a legal concept and, ultimately, as a speech act legitimising war
and thereby replacing the legitimate warringstate – but it has
29 Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Charles W. Ingrao, The
Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick
II 1760–1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
30 Frederic Groß, ‘Einzigartig? – Der Subsidienvertrag von 1786 über die Aufstellung des “Kapregiments” zwischen Herzog Karl Eugen von Württemberg und
der Niederländischen Ostindienkompanie’, in Militärische Migration vom
Altertum bis zur Gegenwart (Studien zur Historischen
–215, esp. p. 180.
5 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State
1688–1783 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). The subsequent debate has
spawned an extensive literature, of which the following offer good introductions: The British Fiscal Military States 1660–c.1783, ed. by Aaron Graham
and Patrick Walsh (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016); War, State and Development:
Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Rafael Torres Sánchez
(Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2007); The Fiscal-Military State
in Eighteenth-century Europe, ed. by
the front came to comprehend an altered moral climate, such as Colonel
Hanbury-Sparrow’s claim that Passchendalele shattered the force of any moral
argument for war. Some men, such as E.P. Southall at his court martial, declared an exemption from the war on specifically moral grounds and, as in
Southall’s case, displayed a recognition that the strictures of the war-state could
only ‘crush moral liberty’.
The ‘coarseness and cruelty of mind’ and resultant mental degradation that
war correspondent Philip Gibbs identified could be said to be similar to the
Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Peter Rauscher, Andrea Serles, and
Thomas Winkelbauer (Munich: Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft, vol. 56, 2012),
87–126 (p. 124); Peter H. Wilson, War, State and Society in Württemberg,
1677–1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 85–86.
9 Peter Lindström and Svante Norrhem, Flattering Alliances: Scandinavia,
Diplomacy and the Austrian-French Balance of Power, 1648–1740 (Lund:
Nordic Academic Press, 2013), pp. 68–74; Peter H. Wilson, German Armies:
War and German Politics 1648–1806 (London: UCL Press, 1998), pp.