, used the summit as the starting point of a new, more passive and low-key approach towards the American initiative. Washington would now leave the matter to be addressed primarily by the Europeans. The Washington summit was useful to Johnson mainly because it allowed him to impress upon the British the need for them to retain their traditional ‘great power’ role and also to allow him to bring the MLF to a conclusion. For
Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations ‘at the summit’, 1964–68
This book is based mainly on government sources, namely material from the White House, State Department, Foreign Office (FO), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Prime Minister's Office (PREM) and Cabinet (CAB). Private papers consulted include those of Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown and Undersecretary of State George Ball. The book explores a period of the Wilson-Johnson relationship. It considers the seven weeks from Wilson's election until he went to see Lyndon B. Johnson on 7-9 December, a formative period in which Britain cultivated American financial support and which saw pre-summit diplomacy over the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). The book covers the summit in detail, examining the diplomatic exchanges over the Vietnam War, the British commitment East of Suez and the MLF, as well as the interplay of personality between Wilson and Johnson. By exploring the relationship of the two leaders in the years 1964-1968, it seeks to examine their respective attitudes to the Anglo-American relationship. The book then assesses the significance of an alleged Anglo-American strategic-economic 'deal', Wilson's 'Commonwealth Peace Mission' to Vietnam, and another Wilson visit to Washington. It also considers why the personal relationship between Johnson and Wilson suffered such strain when the Labour government 'dissociated' the UK from the latest American measures in Vietnam. Next, the book addresses the period from August 1966-September 1967, during which Wilson launched an intense but abortive effort to initiate peace negotiations over Vietnam, and London announced plans to withdraw from military bases East of Suez.
crisis occasioned a great deal of concern on the part of the President, given the possibility that sterling might have to be devalued or that any rise in the Bank of England lending rate could precipitate a run on the dollar. There was also concern about the Multilateral Force (MLF), a matter due to be discussed at the planned summit meeting in Washington early in December. The MLF was a US-sponsored plan to create a mixed-manned NATO
confidence and make sterling strong’. 59 The second summit Despite the rebuff from Johnson on 11 February, Wilson still wanted to visit Washington, for what would be his second trip there since becoming Prime Minister. In his memoirs he indicates that the telegram from the Americans which arrived on 11 February suggested a visit. Yet it would have been incongruous for the White House to make this
Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. Johnson: a ‘special relationship’?
government. At the Washington summit of 7–9 December 1964, Wilson spoke of cementing a ‘close’ Anglo-American relationship, but Johnson regarded the conference as little more than a chore, and a means of dealing with the lingering NATO matter of the MLF. The months January–April 1965 saw Wilson’s over-ambitious and poorly-received telephone call to the White House on 11 February to try to moderate American conduct in Vietnam
the CSCE, Wilson decided that any summit designed to conclude the CSCE should not be agreed to without first obtaining major concessions from the USSR.166 This line of thinking was at variance with that of Washington. As shown earlier, the Nixon administration had initially wished to delay progress on the CSCE as a means of enacting leverage upon other areas of US–Soviet diplomacy. By the middle of 1972, agreements on subjects such as SALT and a Berlin Treaty had been reached and movement on CSCE was now sought. Now, US policy sought a swift resolution to the
institutionalise meetings between statesmen. In the early 1950s the process was further consolidated by Churchill’s calls for a three-power gathering to ease the tensions of the Cold War, and before long it was the case that bilateral meetings (usually held in Washington) had become integral to the Anglo-American relationship. 91 Summits provide leaders with the opportunity to appraise their foreign counterparts person-to-person and can offer a means of
Reflections on contemporary anarchism, anti-capitalism and the international scene
23-year old son of a trade union official, is shot dead. In all this, amidst intense tear gas from canisters fired by police, the different sections attempt to carry on with their chosen themes, from the Pink and Silver carnivalesque to the hundreds of Tute Bianche with their white overalls, padding and makeshift armour. Post-11 September and anti-capitalism After 11 September 2001, and the severe repression of civil liberties, the media declares the movement dead. Nonetheless, a demonstration in January in Washington DC, at the World Economic Forum summit
Kjell M. Torbiörn
Council of Europe nor the OSCE had been able alone to satisfy this aim. The Washington Summit also decided to build a European Security and Defence Identity within the alliance. The policy called for a much stronger European responsibility in handling future conflicts of the Kosovo type. New threats would be brought to NATO’s attention, giving it a right of ‘first refusal’. In cases where the alliance would not want to act as such, a European Union chain of command would be expected to take over responsibility, borrowing equipment from NATO (and especially the United
Kjell M. Torbiörn
new risks, especially since they might have to come to the rescue of EU members also belonging to NATO, under the latter’s collective defensive obligation; a lacking European will to increase defence capabilities to the level necessary for separate action; and duplication of effort, as the new EU structures would work parallel to already existing NATO ones set up to cater for European-led operations (after a Defense Capability Initiative was adopted at NATO’s fifty-year anniversary summit in Washington in 1999 to improve the strength of European military forces