Open Access (free)
Humanitarianism in a Post-Liberal World Order
Stephen Hopgood

1980s, the US, to two now) stems from the rise of China. A kind of bipolarity – a system dominated by two centres of power – has been re-established in global politics. As in other areas – trade, environment, security, public health, transport – the return to bipolarity has had a major impact. The implications of this are simple but profound: rules and norms that conflict in some way with the preferences of the Chinese government will no longer necessarily be enforceable at the global level . We know what this looks like because it is how the

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Editor’s Introduction
Juliano Fiori

accelerate the professionalisation of the aid sector ( Fiori et al ., 2016 ). But at the turn of the millennium, there were indications of a downturn in the influence of humanitarian ideas on Western geostrategy. The strategic value of humanitarian intervention diminished as the US launched its totalising war on terror. Humanitarianism was little more than an afterthought to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then, despite the continued rise in donations to humanitarian agencies, the political currency of liberal humanitarianism and its

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
José Luís Fiori

national interests ( ibid .: 25–6): 1) Russia and China, the two great ‘revisionist powers’; 2) North Korea and Iran, two ‘rogue states’ that undermine geopolitical equilibrium in Northeast Asia and the Middle East; 3) ‘Jihadist terrorist groups’ and international criminal organisations that propagate violence and traffic drugs and arms. The document offers an extensive list of actions to be undertaken by the US to achieve strategic objectives and confront rivals, from controlling borders to increasing military expenditure and protecting competitive

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Open Access (free)
Governing Precarity through Adaptive Design
Mark Duffield

spirit of 1970s direct humanitarian action was fabricated from a deductive process of knowledge formation framed by narratives of history, causation and reciprocity. Reflecting the rise to dominance of a cybernetic episteme, this register has been replaced by a reliance on inductive mathematical data and machine-thinking for sense-making ( Rouvroy, 2012 ). Thinking has been transformed into calculation ( Han, 2013 ). 1 The current dominance within the academy of empiricism and behaviourism reflects this change in world-experience. What is often

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
An Interview with Celso Amorim, Former Brazilian Foreign Minister
Juliano Fiori

. Trump seeks to deconstruct the existing order and anything that might limit American power, even institutions created by the US. This change in strategy happens at a moment when rivals are on the rise. Russia perhaps doesn’t want to be a world leader, but it wants to affirm its regional position. And China, yes, has another plan for the world, which it develops with subtlety, in specific negotiations, always prepared to accept otherness. JF: What are the likely implications of this new US strategy for international cooperation and multilateralism? CA

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Open Access (free)
Planned Obsolescence of Medical Humanitarian Missions: An Interview with Tony Redmond, Professor and Practitioner of International Emergency Medicine and Co-founder of HCRI and UK-Med

Introduction As an academic and practitioner for more than forty years, we asked Tony for his take on innovation from a personal perspective and how this might have changed throughout his career. Tony has worked with medical emergency teams in a range of disasters and conflicts including earthquakes in Armenia (1988), Iran (1990), China (2008) and Haiti (2010), conflicts in Bosnia (1991–96), Kosovo (1999–2000), Sierra Leone (2000) and Gaza (2014), a super typhoon in the Philippines

Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
Obama’s legacy in US China Policy
Peter Gries

different; it takes two, and the right international conditions, to make a successful bilateral relationship. This chapter will argue that circumstances conspired to undermine Obama’s China policy, and that the deterioration of US–China relations during his administration was largely beyond his control. Obama’s Pivot to Asia suffered from an inability to extract the United States from the wars in the Middle East he inherited from Bush, and the rise of Chinese nationalism stymied his hopes of resetting US–China relations. Obama’s Pivot to Asia did, however, leave both

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Washington’s painful search for a credible China policy
Börje Ljunggren

) and the role as the world’s second largest (on par with Japan) and most strategic direct foreign investor. Indeed, authoritarian China is, ironically enough, globalisation’s greatest winner, with justifiably mounting US and EU demands for reciprocity. In the zero-sum worldview of President Donald Trump and his administration, China’s rise, and even the United States’ relationships with some of its closest Asian partners, has been at America’s expense. In his report to the nineteenth party congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that ‘China already stood

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Atul Bhardwaj

shift, Obama’s “Pivot” to Asia from around 2011 represented a fundamental reorientation of the US Navy from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This charting of a new course by the US Navy was not only aimed at revitalising US foreign policy but also stemming its own decline. 4 The chapter explores Obama’s and Trump’s maritime approaches in the Indo-Pacific against the backdrop of the continual rise of China’s Navy. The chapter also asks whether a continued reliance on Mahanian tenets – in particular, fleet engagements and securing overseas bases to control maritime domains

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Christopher K. Colley and Sumit Gunguly

opportunities, to policies based on strategic hedging and the balance of power in the international order. This chapter specifically examines the relationship under the two Obama administrations and the first two years of the Trump administration. It argues that the overriding driver of Indo-US relations during this period was the mutual desire to hedge against the rise of China. Additionally, however, there were other factors influencing ties, chief among these economic considerations. As will be demonstrated, the focus on China and increasing trade links between the United

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific