Limiting institutions?

The postwar security system encompassing the Eurasian landmass was governed by the stable crisis produced by the bipolar distribution of power and the alliance system it spawned. Security governance has received increasing attention since 1989. Its rising conceptual salience is derived in large measure from the challenges presented by the 'new' security agenda. A weak system of security governance in Eurasia could be founded upon a system of alliances. Alliance theory has provided the framework for understanding not only the evolution of the postwar European security order, but that of the European state system since 1648. This chapter also presents key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book investigates the important role played by identity politics in the shaping of the Eurasian security environment.

This chapter investigates both the state in post-Soviet Eurasia as the primary site of institutionalisation and the state's concerted international action in the sphere of security. This investigation requires a major caveat: state-centric approaches to security impose analytical costs by obscuring substate and transnational actors and processes. The construction of Others in Eurasia has taken place through intertwined processes which Graham Smith has called essentialisation, historicisation, and 'totalisation' or the use of absolute categories. In Russia, the discourse of national identity reproduction overwhelmingly includes the explicit identification of hostile Others abroad, such as Islamic fundamentalists and organised criminal gangs. In addition to analysing the way in which national identity determines the direction of foreign policy, it is necessary to consider state strength (or weakness). State capacity directly bears on the viability of state-brokered international institutions.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not only the most audacious and successful terrorist attacks the world has yet seen, but also marked the maturation of what had been described as the 'new terrorism'. There had been voices in the national security community, including on the National Security Council itself, warning about transnational threats such as terrorism and organised crime. If the potential for Atlantic divisions remained very considerable, however, the common interests of the United States and its European allies in combating the challenge from radical Islamic terrorism are difficult to overestimate. This chapter provides a conceptual analysis and assessment of terrorist threats. It considers the nature of the responses that are required as both the United States and European governments adapt to what is a very different kind of security challenge from that for which they prepared during the Cold War.

Historically water provided a cultural, economic and geographical focus for Central Asia. The khanates' political culture, including deferential collectivism, was associated with water scarcity and the organisational requirements of the construction and maintenance of irrigation systems. Water's security implications principally fall within the wider conceptualisation of security, as an indirect or contributory cause to instability. Poor water management affects diplomatic relations, economic development, public health and access to land. The most fundamental and important function that an international institution can undertake is actually managing and allocating the region's water resources. Regional and international organisations have had mixed success in managing Central Asia's water. Most of the Central Asian leaders lack a genuine commitment to finding a viable solution to the regional water crisis. The lack of commitment is evident in the republics' limited support of the relevant organisations.

This chapter assesses the rising geostrategic and geoeconomic importance of Central Asian oil and natural gas for China and the United States, the most transparent source of Sino-American conflict in this region. The oil-rich states of Central Asia have been accorded a privileged place in the American and Chinese foreign policy calculations. As a consequence, these states may become the fodder in any Sino-American competition for geopolitical and geoeconomic predominance in the region. American diplomatic activity in Central Asia prior to September 2001 focused on creating an environment that would privilege American corporations in the exploitation of regional economic and financial opportunities. There has been a progressive realignment of the American military presence in Asia during the past decade. The United States has very slowly crept into the Chinese neighbourhood, from Singapore to Indonesia, from the United Arab Emirates to Oman, and from Uzbekistan and Pakistan to Kazakhstan.